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Stanley Fish is in many ways a nonconforming academic; he defies stereotypes of the typical 
scholar and his work escapes conventional categorisations. Thus, starting out and quickly 
gaining a name for himself as a renowned Milton scholar, his disciplinary contributions span 
English literature, law, interpretive studies as well as commentary on the role of academics 
and the academy more generally. His ability to simultaneously criticise and irritate the Left 
and the Right in the American culture wars is both impressive and frustrating. Those 
despairing of his work (and there are quite a few) varyingly criticise him for perfecting 
‘cynicism as a principle…[and for promoting] a philosophy made safe for yuppies’1 and for 
being a ‘loudmouth [and] a show-off’.2 To members of the UK academy he is perhaps best 
known for his 1993 Clarendon Lectures,
3
 described by one commentator as ‘morally 
disgusting’ and ‘intellectually sullying’4 and for having, so the rumour goes, inspired the 
maverick protagonist Morris Zapp of David Lodge’s academic satire novels Trading Places 
and Small World, in which Zapp informs the reader that his primary ambition is to ‘become 
the best-paid English professor in the world’, while dispensing the following advice to a 
younger colleague: ‘never go to [conference] lectures…unless you’re giving one yourself…. 
or I’m giving one’.5 Despite having retired from full-time academic life several years ago, 
Fish maintains a steady record of publication (although one commentator criticises him for 
‘having written the same book several times over’).6 Recent books include The Fugitive in 
Flight
7
 (about the 1960s US TV series The Fugitive), How to Write a Sentence,
8
 (an excellent 
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exposition on the art of crafting sentences) and, the title under review here, Versions of 
Academic Freedom. 
 In Versions of Academic Freedom, Fish, with his usual vigour and bravado (Fish 
proclaims that he is ‘announcing the inauguration of a new field – Academic Freedom 
Studies’), tackles the thorny issue of what academics are allowed to do and how they are 
allowed to do it as part of their professional practice.
9
 Fish does this by taxonomising what he 
terms the five different schools of academic freedom, while acknowledging that ‘academic 
freedom is rhetorically strong but legally weak’.10 This is likely to be familiar to academics 
based in the UK, where the protection of academic freedom offered by the law is often seen 
as feeble.
11
 The statutory framework in England and Wales, as well as in Scotland, does not 
provide for an absolute right of academic freedom but merely an obligation on various 
statutory agencies to have regard to academic freedom (although the principle is enshrined in 
the EU’s Charter for Fundamental Rights).12 However, s. 6 of the Defamation Act 2013 
provides for an ‘academic’ defence, by privileging statements which have been published in a 
peer-reviewed outlet.
13
 Thus, the principle of academic freedom is one rarely engaged with 
by the UK courts (though one suspects the principle is every so often invoked before 
employment tribunals to which the public has little access) unlike in the USA, where the 
courts have from time to time weighed in on the meaning of the principle.
14
  
Perhaps as a result of this, academic freedom remains a highly illusive and often 
controversial concept, operating simultaneously as a liberty and a restriction, although it can 
usefully be defined as falling either along institutional lines (where freedom is afforded to 
each higher education institution from undue government interference) and/or individual lines 
(where freedom is afforded the individual academic employee from unreasonable employer 
interference).
15
 In this context, one UK academic (who was himself subjected to disciplinary 
proceedings by his employer) recently, and perhaps rather belligerently, proclaimed that ‘the 
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modern university is, in some ways, always at war; and one contemporary battle in that war is 
for the maintenance of academic freedom’.16 For those reasons, and notwithstanding that Fish 
focuses exclusively on US practices, Versions of Academic Freedom offers a highly 
enlightening and entertaining starting point for anyone wanting to explore the subject matter 
in detail, although many will likely find little to agree with in the version of academic 
freedom which Fish ultimately endorses.  
 The five schools of academic freedom, plotted along a continuum from right to left, 
identified by Fish are: (1) the ‘It’s just a job school’; (2) the ‘For common good school’; (3) 
the ‘Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings school’; (4) the ‘Academic freedom as 
critique school’ and (5) the ‘Academic freedom as revolution school’. The school which Fish 
ultimately endorses is the ‘It’s just a job school’ but before examining it in detail we ought to 
briefly focus on the remaining four.  
The ‘For common good school’ is closely aligned with the ‘It’s just a job school’ but 
distinguishes itself therefrom by relying on a factor external to the academy for its ultimate 
justification; that of democracy. That is, the ‘For common good school’, as Fish sees it, 
identifies the role of the academic as one grounded in the need for a well-functioning 
democracy; for the academic is, by virtue of being a member of the profession, under an 
obligation to counter populism and to offer critical input in public discourses.  The 
‘Academic exceptionalism or uncommon beings school’ follows closely from this but goes a 
step further by arguing that if the purpose of the academy is to somehow offer a counterpoise 
to non-academic voices in the public sphere, then this means that academics are a special 
breed. A kind of breed which deserves a level of exceptional protection not afforded, say, to 
other employees. An example of this would be the claim that criminal prosecutions ought not 
to be taken against academics for actions that form part of academic research but nevertheless 
constitute a criminal offence. One such example is the case recently brought against Dr 
Bradley Garrett, a geographer now employed at Southampton University, who was charged 
with (and pleaded guilty to) conspiracy to commit criminal damage when he, as part of his 
ethnography research into urban explorers, took part in the scaling of several buildings.
17
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The ‘Academic freedom as critique school’ posits instead that the real focus of 
academics ought to be one of critique – critique of everything. This notion of academic 
freedom is in part based on the notion that the purpose of higher education is itself that of 
critique. On this understanding, academic freedom is a response to the inherent conservatism 
of the academy and its way of privileging certain protocols and methods, so that critique 
becomes a tool to constantly scrutinise these existing practices and forms of knowledge, all in 
the name of social progress. The ‘Academic freedom as revolution school’ is, as the name 
indicates, the most radical incarnation of the principle of academic freedom. It has as its 
focus a need for eliminating from the academy its ‘neo-liberal’ and corrupt practices and 
bestows upon students an ability to identify and act upon such unjust practices where they 
may be encountered outside the academy. As an example of this Fish cites the on-going 
dispute between Professor Denis Rancourt (now suspended) and the University of Ottawa, 
following from Professor Rancourt’s teaching methods in accordance with what he terms 
‘academic squatting’, i.e. the practice of ignoring the content of existing modules and 
courses, instead focusing instead on political activism. 
 Finally, the ‘It’s just a job school’ takes a much more minimalist focus on the 
definition of academic freedom. It is anchored in a professional definition of education which 
at heart focuses on the acquisition of skills and knowledge through the medium of 
disinterested inquiry – the very product which academics are trained in and expected to use. 
That is why students come to the university in the first place; to acquire the skills which the 
academy is uniquely placed to offer on account of having done so for years. The same 
professional anchoring applies to the carrying out of academic research: the enterprise of 
scholarship rests in practices defined by scholars within disciplines and sub-disciplines as 
these have developed over time. Thus, unlike the ‘For common good school’, the ‘It’s just a 
job school’ is not based on a higher, external good; instead it rests on the narrow vocation and 
professionalism embedded in the academy itself.  
In taking this narrow, non-instrumental approach to the academy, Fish picks up from 
where he left off in his Save the World on Your Own Time in which he defines the core 
purpose of the academy as being that of ‘academicizing’.18 To Fish this entails two things: (1) 
introducing students to bodies of knowledge and tradition of inquiry; and (2) equipping 
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students with analytical skills, enabling them to engage confidently with those traditions in 
order to probe the contours of disciplines and to critique positions within fields.
19
 In doing 
this, no external factors such as ethical, social or democratic concerns are of relevance; nor 
ought they exert any pressure on the enterprise of ‘academicizing’. To Fish, such values 
might well of course flow from the activity of ‘academicizing’, but where this happens it is 
merely a by-product, not the end-product. This gives rise to Fish admonishing those who, 
either through teaching or research, seek to impart on their audiences (be it students or other 
academics) a particular value, such as social justice or democracy. Fish’s reason for 
disregarding such attempts is two-fold. First, when academics seek to include whatever 
laudable values they might hold into their academic work, it leaves the academic profession 
open to criticism from outsiders, such as politicians, who will then be able to discredit the 
profession. Second, when the academic enterprise gives way to any outside influences, it 
ceases to be academic for it has lost what sets it apart from every other activity. The upshot of 
this is that where academics engage in such activities these are, to Fish, neither relevant to 
nor protected by academic freedom. Or, in other words, they are not speaking the academic 
language game. 
 This does not mean, however, that politics is off the table entirely. For academics are, 
according to Fish, allowed to be political about the things that are appropriate to the academic 
enterprise. These include arguing about curriculum development, direction of research and 
the content of teaching.
20
 Neither is politics off the table when it comes to teaching – as long 
as it treated as a topic of inquiry subject to interrogation with the view to establishing the 
truth (which would inevitably be a rather local one), as opposed to a candidate for allegiance. 
The question to bear in mind for academics is thus ‘am I asking my students to produce or 
assess an account of a vexed political issue, or am I asking my students to pronounce on the 
issue?’21 Thus, in the classroom, Fish’s approach insists that any matter is open to scrutiny 
and no matter ought to be excluded as long as it is the subject of analysis. Importantly, 
however, this is not an invitation to try and balance the content of what is ‘academicized’ by 
seeking to include a diverse range of political viewpoints. In doing so, Fish argues that such 
balancing ends up mandating politics rather than eliminating it.
22
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 To many UK-based academics this might seem straightforward and the context in 
which Fish’s defence of a deflationary and professional definition of what it means to be an 
academic arises may well be seen as a peculiarly American one; one which is notably 
different from that endorsed by prominent academics like Noam Chomsky and Richard 
Rorty.
23
 At least in so far as Rorty the political activist goes; for there is a significant amount 
of common ground between Fish and Rorty the philosopher, when Rorty declares that, in line 
with his general scepticism towards metaphysical propositions, academic freedom rests not 
on philosophical presuppositions and epistemological justifications but on social practices.
24
 
There is, however, one reason why Fish’s arguments resonate more deeply and ought 
to be considered more widely. Fish’s defence of academic virtues hinges exclusively on the 
internal commitment to a ‘guild’ which is committed to its very own practice, or job, which is 
that of the advancement of knowledge and search for truth. Again, this is what academics do 
in each of their separate disciplines; they strive to deliver ‘first-rate literary criticism’ or, 
from the lawyer’s point of view, legal analysis.25 For the lawyer, the commitment is thus one 
to the ‘inquiry into the intellectual coherence of rules and doctrines’, not one to higher goals 
such as ‘justice’, ‘political desirability’ or ‘cost-effectiveness’, even where these might be 
identified as aspirations for the law itself.
26
 This justification is thus entirely internal, and the 
academy can only do this if it is left to its own devises and practices. Fish argues:  
Higher education is not valuable because of the benefit some nonacademics might see 
in it; that’s like valuing the theatre or art because they bring people into the inner city. 
Higher education is valuable (if it is) because of the particular pleasures it offers to 
those who are drawn to it...
27
  
This is noteworthy if for no other reason that it is exactly to such external pressures 
that the UK academic’s work is gradually being subjected. This is most noteworthy when it 
comes to the need for having to show socially or economically beneficial impacts associated 
with academic research under the Research Excellence Framework (REF). Increasingly, 
value is being attached to academic research on account of its societal benefit as opposed to 
the intrinsic account put forward by Fish; in some extreme cases to the extent that the 
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academic research enterprise is shaped with the object of impact in mind, thereby detracting 
from the core purpose of inquiry. As Fish, rather bluntly, puts it elsewhere: ‘If you want to 
send a message that will be heard beyond the academy, get out of it.’28 This of course is not 
to say that academic work never has or should not have any impact outside its own practice. 
But where this does happen, it ought to take place as an unintended consequence rather than a 
deliberate attempt to influence matters external to the academy. Specifically aiming at 
generating impact from academic research simply serves the purpose of instrumentalising the 
academic.
29
 In this context, it is worth noting that Fish’s critique of attempts to justify 
academic activities by reference to external factors stands aside from the often advanced 
critique of the ‘impact agenda’ on grounds that this is varyingly ‘neo-liberal’ or that it is 
urging academics to become door-to-door salesmen and women.
30
 While Fish would be 
equally despairing of attempts to link academic activities with commercial benefits, he does 
not single out commercial objectives for specific scorn, as a majority of the literature does, 
but is critical of external justifications end off; irrespective of whether these might be 
commercial, social or democratic.  
 A similar yet equally misunderstood pressure on the academic enterprise is felt when 
universities explicitly strive to reach beyond their immediate ‘users’ on account of being 
‘civic universities’ or, from the point of view of a law school, a ‘liberal law school’.31 To 
Fish, and this reviewer is inclined to agree, these are ‘political rather than academic goals’.32 
In seeking to explicitly engage in such activities, universities ‘are guilty both of practicing 
without a license and of defaulting on our professional responsibilities’.33 A particularly 
strong reason for paying attention to Fish’s arguments is that these are not shots fired from a 
characteristically disgruntled ivory tower academic (although Fish would likely wear this 
characterization as a badge of honour) who is frustrated by the trespassing on his time 
committed by administrative duties and longing for the time when academic influence was 
gained concurringly with and in the same manner as gout; simply by ‘sit[ting] tight and 
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drink[ing] port wine’.34 Instead, Fish’s criticism comes from someone who has served as an 
academic administrator for several years.
35
 Perhaps ironically, a further justification for 
Fish’s minimalist ‘It’s just a job school’ can be found in the so-called ‘commodification’ of 
higher education now firmly established in the UK. In a situation where the primary burden 
of financing the ‘goods’ falls on the student, who thereby funds the acquisition of whatever 
skills each academic discipline is dispensing, it might well be more reasonable for the 
academic institution to focus exclusively on developing and supporting those skills rather 
than focusing on external matters such as engagement and impact.   
 Having said that, many readers will likely find something to disagree with in Fish’s 
account of academic freedom. If nothing else, Fish’s self-assuredness will likely be off-
putting to some, and several of his opinions on other aspects of the academic enterprise 
remain highly controversial, to say the least. These views include an opposition to blind 
journal submission on the following reasoning: ‘I am against blind submission because the 
fact that my name is attached to an article greatly increases its chances of getting accepted.’36 
Similarly, Fish’s honest and forthright criticism of the extensive use of student evaluation on 
account of the practical inability of students (for good reasons) to ‘defer judgement’ is, while 
likely to fall on deaf ears, refreshing.
37
  
At times, one gets the impression that Fish’s portrayal of the schools of thought and 
academic freedom with which he disagrees accords with the oppositional strategy of 
‘simplifying and exaggerating’ any disagreeable characteristics. Similarly, Fish’s argument 
for an academy anchored in a seemingly neutral disposition of ‘academicizing’ may seem at 
odds with much of what Fish has spent most of his career in arguing, for he has famously 
sought to dispel the myth of neutral procedures and principles as these are varyingly put 
forward and incorporated in, for example, liberalism and pragmatism, on account of there 
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being no neutral ground from which one can gain a vantage point over specific matters.
38
 
Thus, Fish has in the past alerted us to what he calls the intolerance of liberalism by asking 
‘where does reason come from?’39 The answer to the question is, to Fish (and this reviewer is 
inclined to agree), that reason ‘will always be a matter of faith’;40 in other words, ‘every 
church is orthodox to itself’ and in trying to strike a balance between competing ‘reasons’ 
there is no impartial and inherently tolerant process for deciding.
41
 For ‘procedural rules 
always have content and…specifying them will always be a matter of substantive 
judgement’.42 Importantly, this argument is increasingly being accentuated by a wealth of 
empirical evidence from disciplines such as social psychology and behavioural economics, 
supporting the claim that seemingly innocuous pieces of information are interpreted and 
processed in accordance with pre-conceived cognitive biases.
43
  
Notwithstanding this, Versions of Academic Freedom is a highly enlightening and 
engaging read written with the typical contrarian penchant and tongue-in-cheek vigour that 
are Fish’s trademark. More importantly, it exerts a pressure on the thoughtful reader, forcing 
her/him to reflect on where she/he stands on this rather important matter. In doing so, Fish 
pays homage to what can be described as the most important role of the modern public 
intellectual: ‘to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb 
people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and 
accepted’44 and ‘to be opinionated, judgmental, sometimes condescending, and often 
waspish’;45 qualities which are all the more important when, on one analysis, universities 
cease being centres of critique. So, even if for no other reason, Fish’s account of academic 
freedom is worth reading because it is thought-provoking, engaging and humorous. After all, 
who else might get away with writing, with an equal measure of self-aggrandisement and 
self-debasement, that academics want to be downtrodden and oppressed; for ‘in the psychic 
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economy of the academy, oppression is the sign of virtue [… making academics] 
indistinguishable from the faces of medieval martyrs.’46  
 
Ole W Pedersen 
Newcastle Law School  
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